Judith Miller’s Absurd Take on Boston

Judith Miller’s recent article in the Wall Street Journal, titled “How to Stop Terrorists Before They Kill,” is just as bad as you think it would be.

In its basest form, Miller’s article contrasts the New York Police Department’s robust counterterrorism program with Boston officialdom’s jester-like handling of the Boston marathon bombings. She even goes so far as to state, “some terrorism experts say that the attack…may well have been prevented entirely had the perpetrators lived in New York City.”

Leaving aside the questions of who “some terrorism experts” are, Miller’s own questionable track record as an expert reporter, and the article’s completely ridiculous title, this piece is both meaningless and mean. It pits New York against Boston in the aftermath of a tragedy so bad that even the Yankees came out with support for Boston.

Miller’s article is so full of such subjunctive phrases as “almost surely would have” and “would likely have,” that even a politician’s response to sexual allegations sounds more straightforward.

She also quotes experts who have a stake in pimping for New York’s program, since they helped build it. They play Monday morning quarterback like pros, saying things like, “[Tsarnaev’s] behavioral changes alone—never mind his overseas trip and Russia’s warning to the FBI that he was a radical—would have been more than enough to trigger NYPD scrutiny.”

Sure, maybe. Maybe not. Let’s not forget that the would-be Times Square car bomber only came to NYPD’s attention after some street vendors noticed smoke coming from the car.

And according to Miller, “In New York, Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s mosque quarrel and his sudden behavioral changes might well have been reported by concerned worshipers, the imam himself, or other fellow Muslims. The NYPD maintains close ties to Muslim preachers and community leaders, as well as a network of tipsters and undercover operatives.” There’s that subjunctive phrasing again, “might well have been reported,” falling well below any threshold of certainty. In addition, Miller fails to supply any evidence to say such relationships between law enforcement and the community did not (or do not continue to) exist in Boston.

She concludes, “Finally, there is the NYPD’s continuing effort to understand Muslim communities and follow tips and leads by sending plainclothes officers to mosques, restaurants and other public venues where Muslims congregate. This effort—which follows court-ordered guidelines—might have secured information preventing last week’s bombings.” Again, using her subjunctive phrasing, she fails to prove that such efforts did not take place in Boston.

It is true that New York has an incredibly robust counterterrorism program. The program has its supporters and its critics. But no matter what you think of it, writing an article that essentially sets New York against Boston in the sport of counterterrorism, as if New York is sneering at Beantown saying, “Ha-ha, we would have done better than you,” is just simply absurd.

Let me know what you think. Do you approve of the NYPD’s program? Do you think Boston  officials dropped the ball? Send me your comments!

I stand by my last post

I am sticking with my compliments to the FBI, despite what a number of idiots on Capitol Hill have to say about the organization’s performance in Boston. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) recently commented that 12 years after 9/11, we are still unable to connect the dots and that the system “is still not working.”

He is right that it is not working, but not because no one can connect the dots. It’s because Congress has overburdened both the FBI and CIA with so much unnecessary process that it is impossible to keep up with the volume of boxes that need to be checked and at the same time to find anything meaningful in the information. 

Tamerlan Tsarnaev was included in three different databases, all of which were created in the flurry of post-9/11 intelligence reforms: a Guardian file, maintained by the FBI; the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), maintained by the Department of Homeland Security; and the Terrorist Identities Datamart Enviroment system, maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center. 

Each database contained a different spelling of Tsarnaev’s name. And they each contain way too many names to make any of them meaningful.

These databases are only one example of the redundancies that have been put in place since 9/11. 

The FBI and CIA officers involved in this case didn’t drop the ball. They knew who Tsarnaev was. My guess is that officers from both organizations feel angry that they couldn’t do more because they were so busy filling out required forms in triplicate and reporting through various different channels exactly what they were up to and waiting for permission to proceed from a 30-person operational committee (some of whose members were on flex-time, thus precluding the quorum necessary to take a final vote). They were probably also told by management that chasing a radical Chechen wouldn’t get anyone promoted.

Some redundancy is good. But when FBI and CIA officers become so entrenched responding to Congressional mandates (usually written, by the way, in a manner that demonstrates how little members understand about the collection of intelligence), such redundancy becomes not just bad, but a liability. 

I hope Congress does not overreact and add ever more regulations after the Boston experience. We can and should always look for ways to improve, but additional bureaucracy is not the answer.

What do you think?? Send me a comment!